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A “Fair” Trade Law of Nations, or 
A “Fair” Global Law of Economic Relations? 
 
Frank J. Garcia1
Boston College Law School 
I. Intro 
 Our conference focuses on a particular international trade dispute – actually a 
series of inter-related cases – known as the Softwood Lumber dispute, and the institutions 
we have created to manage such disputes: international economic law, the WTO, 
NAFTA, and national courts.2  In particular, we are being asked to consider how this 
dispute reflects, and contributes to, the larger debate between those who advocate free 
                                                 
1 Professor, Boston College Law School.  The author would like to thank Russell Miller and Rebecca 
Bratspies for the invitation to deliver this address, and the conference participants for their many insightful 
comments.  Particular thanks go to Tomer Broude, Chi Carmody, Jeffrey Dunoff and Joost Pauwelyn for 
their very useful comments on earlier drafts of this essay, and to Matthew Hoisington and Daniel Blanchard 
for exceptional research assistance.  Portions of this essay are adapted from an earlier essay on 
globalization and legal theory, Globalization and the Theory of International Law, 11INT’L L. THEORY 9 
(2005).  Both essays are drawn from a larger ongoing project on globalization, available in draft form as 
“Globalization, Global Community, and the Possibility of Global Justice,” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=661564.  
2 See Chi Carmody, Softwood Lumber Dispute (2001-2006), 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 664 (2006).  The WTO 
cases considered are, in order, Panel Report, United States--Preliminary Determinations with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002), Appellate Body Report, United 
States-- Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004), Appellate Body Report, United States--Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004), and Panel Report, United States--
Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS277/R 
(Mar. 22, 2004).  The NAFTA cases considered are, in order, In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products 
from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (NAFTA 
Ch. 19 Binational [U.S.-Can.] Panel Aug. 13, 2003, June 7, 2004, Dec. 1, 2004, May 23, 2005, Oct. 5, 
2005, & Mar. 17, 2006), In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative 
Antidumping Determination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (NAFTA Ch. 19 Binational [U.S.-Can.] Panel July 
17, 2003, Mar. 5, 2004, & June 9, 2005), In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final 
Affirmative Threat of Injury Determination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (NAFTA Ch. 19 Binational [U.S.- 
Can.] Panel Sept. 5, 2003, Apr. 19, 2004, & Aug. 31, 2004), and In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products 
from Canada, Order, ECC-2004-1904-01USA (NAFTA Ch. 19 Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Aug. 10, 
2005).
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trade, and those who advocate fair trade.3 In this essay, I propose to offer the largest 
possible context I can in which to examine this dispute and this question, and what they 
both mean for the evolution of these institutions.  That context is globalization. 
 But first, a word about the question I pose in the title of this essay.  Behind the 
debates over free versus fair trade, it is generally assumed that the object of the inquiry is 
the fairness of any one state’s position vis-à-vis another state.  This is certainly a 
legitimate and important inquiry.  However, I think this debate also reflects a deeper 
underlying assumption about the nature of trade law, economic relations, and global 
social relations generally.  This has been called the “society of states” model of 
international relations, and it has been the dominant contemporary account of the social 
basis of international law for over three hundred years.4 In this view, international law 
exists to order a community in which states are the members. 
  This is where globalization comes in.  The phenomenon of globalization has been 
widely studied in recent years, and I will say more about it shortly.  Let me just suggest at 
the outset that as a social process in which space is essentially eliminated as a factor in 
social relations,5 globalization is altering the nature of global social relations.  By lifting 
relationships out of the strictly territorial into the “global” or meta-territorial, 
globalization is subjectively altering our inter-personal experience, and shifting 
regulatory processes away from the nation state, both of which are contributing towards 
                                                 
3 On the “free trade” versus “fair trade” debate, see, e.g., PATRICK LOW, TRADING FREE 27–30 (BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION 1993) (discussing calls for “fair trade” as a search for reciprocity and a demand for unilateral 
government intervention). 
4 See CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 67-123 (PRINCETON 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 1979) (overview of the society of states model of international relations, superseding 
earlier Realist paradigm). 
5 See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY (STANFORD: STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 1990) p. 64 (globalization as interdependence without differentiation of time and space); DAVID 
HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POST-MODERNITY (OXFORD: BLACKWELL PUBLISHERS 1988) p. 240.  Held?  
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the emergence of something that could be called global society, and perhaps even global 
community.   
 The significance of globalization lies in its transformation and extension of social 
interactions beyond national boundaries.  Thus globalization itself is creating the kinds of 
social relationships at the global level, which make justice both possible and necessary. 
This has fundamental implications for the nature of global social policy, particularly 
international law and international trade law, which brings me back to our subject today.  
The “fair” trade debate presupposes two independent contending foes, a “me” versus a 
“you,” a “mine” versus a “theirs.”  If what I am suggesting about globalization is correct, 
then we are moving beyond such terms, into a realm of “us” and “ours.”  When viewed in 
this light, the Softwood Lumber dispute in fact demonstrates how we employ shared 
institutions to help us determine what is best for our shared social space, and in the 
process contribute to the creation and definition of that space.  
 
II. Beyond the Society of States 
 The dominant contemporary account of the social basis of international law has 
been the “society of states” model.6 In this view, to the extent that international law 
constructs an ordered social space (a claim contested since Hobbes if not before), it is a 
social space in which states are the subjects.  In other words, international law exists to 
order a community in which states are the members.  
 This view of international law as regulating a society of states has two important 
normative implications, both flowing from the model’s core analogy of states to persons.  
                                                 
6   See generally BEITZ, supra note 4, at 67-123 (overview of the society of states model of international 
relations, superseding earlier Realist paradigm). 
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First, it asserts a strong view of state autonomy: like persons in domestic society, states in 
international society are viewed as autonomous sources of moral ends, immune from 
external interference.7 Second, there is no principle of distributive justice to which states 
are subject; they are presumed to be entitled to the resources they control.8 Taken 
together, this approach can be called the “morality of states” model of international 
justice.9
 We can see this approach played out doctrinally in many key areas.  For example, 
the core doctrines of non-intervention, self-determination and state responsibility treat the 
state as the primary locus of autonomy, self-realization, and rights, and are framed largely 
in view of the interests and needs of territorial states.  Even international harms to 
individuals have been traditionally understood within a framework of harm to a state’s 
rights.  In all cases, the analogy between states and persons controls, and it is the state’s 
liberty and rights which are defined as primary subjects of the law.10   
 Pressure to shift away from this model began in earnest in the mid-20th century, 
through human rights, international economic law, and the emergence of international 
civil society, all of which render the “society of states” model increasingly deficient both 
empirically and normatively. Criticisms of current international law and institutions point 
to the changing role of the state, the emergence of new actors and networks, the lack of 
democratic participation and legitimacy, the lack of distributive justice, and the lack of 
                                                 
7BEITZ, supra note 4, at 65-66. 
8 Beitz has analogized this to 19th century liberalism at the international level: “a belief in the liberty of 
individual agents, with an indifference to the distributive outcomes of their economic interaction.” Id. 
9 Id. 
10 To cite just one example of the doctrinal pre-eminence of this view, the society of states model underlies 
the entire approach to international law taken in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. The 
Restatement asserts that “international law is the law of the international community of states,” and “states 
are the principal persons in international law.” All other entities with any personality (international 
organizations and natural persons themselves) derive their personhood, and the extent of their legal rights 
in international law, from grants flowing from the primary persons: states.  Restatement p. 16-17, 70-1. 
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basic welfare rights and security for all individuals.  All this points to the limits of the 
model, but what is to replace it? 
 
III Globalization, Global Society and Global Community  
 The dominant contemporary project to reconfigure international law at the 
theoretical level emphasizes the fundamental moral status of individual persons, drawing 
on the work of Kant and others, and goes by the name “cosmopolitanism.”11 Such efforts, 
however, run into a variety of theoretical problems, including important communitarian 
objections to the possibility of global justice, on the ground that justice is a virtue within 
political communities, not between them.12 This objection fits well with the “society of 
states” model, freezes us in a bi-polar “fair” trade debate, and helps keep the justice 
conversation out of international law.   
 Globalization is, however, changing the nature of this debate.  By effectively 
eliminating both time and space as factors in social interaction,13 globalization is 
changing the nature of global social relations, and creating the basis for both society and 
community at the global level.  Viewed from the perspective of political theory, 
globalization is lifting relationships out of the strictly territorial into the “global” or meta-
territorial.14 The political and legal significance of this change is immediate and 
fundamental: as the space in which we conduct our social relations changes, our manner 
                                                 
11 See generally Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the State System,” in POLITICAL 
RESTRUCTURING IN EUROPE (BROWN ED. 1994) (surveying contemporary cosmopolitanism).  
12 See generally DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (OXFORD: CLARENDON PRESS 1995), MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (NEW YORK: BASIC BOOKS1983) (raising general communitarian objections 
to global justice). 
13 For a comprehensive overview from a legal perspective of globalization as a phenomenon, emphasizing 
changes in the perception of time and space, see Heba Shams, “Law in the Context of ‘Globalisation:’ A 
Framework of Analysis,” 35 INT’L LAWYER 1589 (2001). 
14 Id.; see generally GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS (HELD, ET AL. EDS 1999) (reviewing evolution of meta-
state institutions). 
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of regulating those relations must change as well.  To be effective, regulatory decisions 
must increasingly involve the meta-state level.  Globalization thus requires a fundamental 
re-examination of social regulation and governance at the global level, leading to a 
system in which states may still have a preeminent role, but not the only role.15   
 For our purpose here, we need to understand how globalization is changing the 
nature of social relations, at the national and at the “global” levels, and paving the way 
for global society, global community, and for global justice, even on communitarian 
terms.16  This change has a fundamental impact on the possibilities open to international 
law, and on the way we understand and manage disputes such as Softwood. 
 A Globalization and the Conditions of Justice    
 First, as a threshold matter, it is important to understand how globalization is 
getting us to “society” before we consider how it might be getting us to “community.”  In 
order to do this in a preliminary fashion, I will use Rawls’ concept of the circumstances 
of justice, and apply it to globalization.   
 Globalization is bringing about at the global level the conditions which make 
justice both possible, and necessary, at the domestic level, which Rawls calls the 
circumstances of justice.17 Rawls lists five circumstances: a moderate scarcity of 
resources, a shared geographical territory, a capacity to help or harm each other, and, 
subjectively, that people are both non-altruistic, and hold conflicting claims.18 These 
circumstances make it rational to cooperate for our mutual self-interest, and necessitate 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 2004); 
MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (BLACKWELL 1996). 
16 My treatment here draws on a fuller exposition of these issues in my working paper on globalization.  See 
supra note 1. 
17 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 126-130 (Harvard Belknap1971) (overview of circumstances of 
justice). 
18 Id. 
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the elaboration of principles of justice, and institutions, through which to allocate the 
fruits of such cooperation. 
 The key point is that globalization is bringing about the same circumstances of 
justice at the global level, which Rawls described at the domestic level.  To begin with, 
there is of course the same basic scarcity of resources at the global level.  Through 
globalization, people are increasingly competing for the same resources on a global scale 
in a shared territory: our planet.  That they are non-altruistic and assert conflicting claims 
over these resources does not need to be argued. 
 Because of globalization, we also now have the capacity to help and to harm each 
other at the global level as well, to an unprecedented degree.  Through globalization, we 
increasingly find that we have a capacity to effectively respond to the needs and concerns 
of others beyond our boundaries, through the transnational mobilization of information, 
power, capital, or public opinion.19 Because of globalization, we also increasingly find 
that our state’s policies, and our own political and consumer choices, are influencing the 
life prospects of others in direct and dramatic ways.  The globalization of markets means 
that in many cases we are directly profiting from the economic and social conditions in 
other parts of the world.  Thus, completing Rawls’ basic conditions, we have the capacity 
to harm each other as well.   
 Together, these global circumstances of justice offer one kind of argument for 
global society, making justice both possible and necessary at the global level.  A second, 
                                                 
19 CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE 9 (Oxford University Press 1999).  Even David Miller, a 
communitarian critic of global justice, acknowledges that the “prosaic observation that the rich countries 
now have the technical capacity to transfer large quantities of resources to the poorer countries,” makes a 
prima facie case that such transfers have become morally obligatory.  “The Limits of Cosmopolitan 
Justice,” in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 164 (MAPEL AND NARDIN EDS. 1998). 
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more ambitious argument is that globalization is going farther than creating merely global 
society, and is creating global community, at least to a limited degree. 
 B. Globalization and Community   
 For communitarians, concepts of justice depend upon the prior existence of social 
relationships, which create obligations of justice by defining the principles, subjects and 
objects of justice.20 In other words, society is more than the field of application for 
justice: it creates justice itself.  No society, no justice. 
 To be more precise, communitarians speak of the absence of community at the 
global level, as something “deeper” than mere society.  Communitarians maintain that 
although we may share a common humanity and mutual interests, we do not share 
obligations of justice unless we already share certain kinds of social relations, usually 
identified with the nation, and generally expressed in terms of shared traditions, practices 
and understandings.21 Put another way, communitarians might grant the existence of 
some kind of global society, consisting of associations for mutual self- interest, but 
distinguishable from true “community,” which requires something more, reserving 
“justice” for the latter. 
 That something more is generally expressed as a sense of common purpose, or 
solidarity.22 For Walzer, it is a society’s shared life which determines justice, and not the 
other way around.  Justice therefore requires a prior community, in which all relevant 
distributive decisions take place according to shared traditions, practices and 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., supra note 12; The communitarian critique of cosmopolitan global justice is only part of its 
larger critique of liberal justice, and liberalism generally.  See Allen E. Buchanan, “Assessing the 
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Ethics 99 (1989) pp. 852-82 (summarizing this critique). 
21 Communitarian theorists differ on the precise nature of these necessary relations, and in general this 
aspect of communitarianism is under-theorized.  See Buchanan, supra note 20, at 867. 
22 Id. at 856-57 (community requires more than association – shared common ends). 
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understandings of justice.  In Walzer’s words, justice “is rooted in the distinct 
understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, which constitute a shared way 
of life.”23  
 This is where globalization, once again, comes in.  Essentially, my argument is 
that globalization itself is contributing to the emergence of such shared traditions, 
practices and understandings at the global level, making global justice possible even for 
communitarians.  
 One basis for global community is the globalization of knowledge.  Through 
globalization, we know so much more, immediately and intimately, about the plight of 
people in other parts of the world.  One specific type of shared knowledge important to 
globalization is the growing recognition of the risks we share as human beings on this 
planet, and our shared interest in addressing those risks.  In this sense, globalization is 
creating what has been called a “community of risk.”24
 Such knowledge satisfies a basic requirement for community – that we have the 
capacity to know another’s needs, concerns and preferences.  This kind of knowledge is 
the basis for creating solidarity, that leap of the moral imagination which says that your 
concerns are my concerns.    
 This community of knowledge and risk is also, increasingly, becoming a 
community of shared traditions, practices and understandings.  These grow, both 
spontaneously and institutionally, out of our perception of shared needs and interests, of 
our capacity to help and to harm, and our awareness of each other’s plight – in short, our 
understanding of globalization as interlocking our fates.  Despite the reality of conflict 
                                                 
23.  See WALZER, supra note 12, at 314. 
24 Dirk Messner, “World Society – Structures and Trends,” in GLOBAL TRENDS & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
24 (KENNEDY, ET AL. EDS. 2002). 
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over social practices and values, we are increasingly a part of many sorts of global social 
networks.25 Moreover, commentators suggest that at least at the political level, there is an 
emerging consensus, or shared understanding, around the importance of markets, 
democracy and human rights.26   
 C. Globalization, Markets, and Meta-state Institutions 
 I would like to focus on two particular aspects of contemporary globalization, 
markets and the meta-state institutions which regulate them, as particularly relevant to a 
discussion of the implications of Softwood, and particularly indicative of global shared 
understandings and the emergence of global community, at least in their respective 
realms. 
  1. Market Society as a Set of Shared Practices 
 To the extent that globalization is creating a global market society, this in itself is 
a shared practice or set of practices, albeit quite complex, contributing to a community of 
interests.  The advanced capitalist form of market society practiced by the most 
developed countries is not, of course, implemented in identical ways even in all market 
societies.27 Nevertheless, market society has certain attributes – the need for bureaucratic 
regulation, recognition of private property, and functioning civil courts, to name a few – 
which by virtue of their significant spill-over effects contribute to the formation of shared 
                                                 
25 Examples include multi-national corporations, NGO’s and various organs of international scientific 
cooperation.  
26 This consensus can be seen at the level of positive international law, and also normatively, insofar as the 
world’s leading religious and philosophical traditions can be said to converge around this triad.  David R. 
Mapel, “Justice Diversity and Law in International Society,” in David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin, (eds.) 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS1998) p.247. . 
27 Indeed, markets have been touted on instrumental grounds precisely because they can facilitate efficient 
transfers among people who do not share conceptions of the good.  Jon Mandle, “Globalization and  
Justice” 570 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 126, 130.  
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interests among participants.28 Not the least of these is an interest in developing 
institutions which supplement and mitigate the rigors of capitalism, compensating the 
“losers” through some form of wealth transfer.   
  2.  Shared Understanding of the Need for Meta-State Institutions 
 Perhaps the strongest force for, and evidence of, an emerging global limited 
community involves our shared need to look to institutions beyond the state in order to 
frame an adequate social response to many of the problems and challenges we face.  In 
other words, the need for increased global governance is itself a shared understanding, 
and the reality of global governance by its nature constitutes a shared practice.  The 
prominent role of meta-state institutions in Softwood is a particularly apt illustration of 
this trend. 
 Globalization’s many aspects are together pushing us towards increased 
cooperation at the meta-state level.  In Rawls’ account of the circumstances of justice, our 
response to these circumstances is to enter into systems of social cooperation for mutual 
advantage.  Through this cooperation we create the “basic structure,” the institutions 
which we employ to allocate resources and opportunities, and which thereby directly 
affect our life prospects.  By leading us to create new institutions and shift responsibility 
for many social allocations to the meta-state level, globalization is creating a global basic 
structure.29 Social allocation today is increasingly conducted through a complex 
partnership, consisting of states and their constituent units; international organizations; 
                                                 
28 See e.g. Don Slater and Fran Tonkiss, MARKET SOCIETY (Cambridge: Polity Press 2001) pp. 92-116 
(surveying range of institutions which markets require/are embedded in). 
29 For an interesting analysis of the issues presented by the possibility of a global basic structure, see Simon 
Caney, “The Global Basis Structure: Its Nature and Moral Relevance,” (Sep. 2, 2004) 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p58933_index.html (paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association). 
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and non-state actors through mechanisms such as the market; all regulated or established 
through international law.30 Through globalization we find ourselves in precisely the sort 
of cooperative venture for mutual advantage that is the subject of justice, and allocating 
the fruits of social cooperation (trade opportunities, for example), through meta-state 
institutions such as the WTO, NAFTA and the EU. 
 This move to the meta-state level could be seen as merely tending towards the 
creation of global society, which in the communitarian view does not entail global 
community.  However, I would like to suggest three ways in which this shift towards the 
meta-state level has profound communitarian consequences.   
 First, this shift indicates that the communitarian assumption of bounded 
distributive communities no longer holds at the nation-state level, necessitating a shift to 
a “higher” or “more inclusive” level of community in which all relevant distributive 
decisions are taken – the global level.  Walzer describes the political community of 
justice as one “capable of arranging [its] own patterns of division and exchange, justly or 
unjustly.”31  When a community is no longer capable of fixing its own patterns of 
division and exchange, it is no longer sufficient to analyze the justice of that community 
with sole reference to itself.32  In other words, unable to fix its own distributions entirely 
itself, it is not capable of delivering its own justice.  We must therefore look to that 
                                                 
30 The many players and institutions involved in Softwood – trade associations, national courts, regional 
institutions and multi-lateral institutions - dramatically illustrate this point.  All of these institutions, both 
within their individual jurisdictions and in some sense together, were involved in allocative decision-
making concerning fair or unfair lumber practices in the North American lumber industry.  See supra note 
2; see also JONES, supra note 19 (“The institutions and quasi-formal arrangements affecting persons life 
prospects throughout the world are increasingly international ones (citing as examples international 
financial institutions, multi-national corporations, the G-8 and the WTO)….”). 
31.  WALZER, supra note 12, at 31. 
32 This also resembles the point raised earlier about the tenability of Rawls’ assumption of self-contained 
national distributive communities, in his analysis of domestic justice.   See RAWLS, supra note 17. 
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further level of institutions which is affecting that community’s distributions, and to its 
justice.   
 This is precisely the effect of globalization.33  From a distributive perspective, 
globalization is revealing domestic society to be an incomplete community, incapable of 
securing the overall well-being of its members by itself, leading to a higher level of 
community as part of group efforts to secure well being.34 This is exactly the pattern we 
see in Softwood, as participants are forced by evolving international legal obligations and 
the changing nature of the market itself, to seek definitive resolution of this issue beyond 
the national courts level, at the level of meta-state institutions.  In a similar sense, the 
many anti-globalization protests focused on multilateral institutions indicates the growing 
awareness that these institutions are increasingly constraining allocative decision-making 
at the national level, as well as themselves engaging in positive distributive functions, 
through the allocation of trade benefits, critical currencies and development aid, for 
example. 
 Second, the fact that globalization is forcing us to look to international institutions 
such as the NAFTA and the WTO for global policy solutions, has a community-building 
effect as well.  The role played by common institutions sharing a common language in 
building polities out of disparate peoples has long been recognized in domestic politics as 
“nation-building.”35 For example, in the U.S. we reinforce our shared identity as a nation 
when we together look to the federal level for resource allocations and policy responses, 
                                                 
33 See Alberto Tita, "Globalization: A New Political and Economic Space Requiring Supranational 
Governance", Journal of World Trade, June 1998, at 49 (globalization leads to internal pressures on states 
as traditional macroeconomic policy tools “become less and less capable of being determined at a national 
level by democratically elected governments.”). 
34 See also Robert P. George, “Natural Law and International Order,” in Mapel and Nardin, supra note 26, 
at 54-69.   
35 Will Kymlicka, “Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective,” in D. Miller and S. Hashmi 
(eds.), BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE  (PRINCETON: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY Press 2001), p. 256. 
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as in the case of natural disasters or security crises.  Similarly, our tendency to look at 
least in part to meta-state institutions for responses to global social and environmental 
problems reflects a shared understanding that such institutions play an increasingly 
prominent role in formulating or channeling social policy decisions and orchestrating 
social welfare responses, and that few states can act without them on any important social 
issue.36 Even the many recent anti-globalization protests, by turning up on the doorsteps 
of the same international institutions again and again, emphasize the emergence of this 
shared understanding. 
 Third, this shift to meta-state institutions represents the emergence of a shared 
understanding with respect to regulating global social conflict.  In domestic communities, 
one answer to the problem of conflict is to change the level of analysis to 
“understandings about understandings,” or “shared public cultures.” When responding to 
the fact of social conflict, particularly conflict over what are purportedly “shared” 
understandings, communitarians shift the level of analysis to a secondary set of practices 
and understandings, a system for managing conflicts over understandings and their 
application.37  
 This suggests that communitarians are actually linking justice to a kind of shared 
institutional culture, rather than a true community of shared primary beliefs.38  If so, this 
shift to meta-state institutions has profound consequences for global justice.  In the 
development of new forms of meta-state institutional governance, we are also developing 
                                                 
36 The public nature of the Softwoods dispute has contributed to a broader shared understanding of how 
regional trade and integration have linked U.S. and Canadian social policy and even politics. 
37 Walzer suggests that disagreements over the meaning of social goods – cases in which a given social 
understanding is controversial - trigger a sort of “second order” set of understandings concerning how 
disputes are to expressed, managed and adjudicated.    See WALZER, supra note 12, at 313. 
38 Perhaps what communitarians are identifying when they speak of the common good is really a 
commitment to this second-order set of understandings about disputes: the rules about rules, the public 
culture.   
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a new form of shared understanding, or rules about rules, at the global level.  When 
global social relations involve conflicts between incomplete national communities of 
justice over allocative decisions, globalization bumps us up a level, invoking a new 
shared understanding that the meta-state level is the place to resolve this conflict, 
according to new understandings regarding appropriate distributions at the global level.  
Insofar as these global practices deepen and extend, we see stronger shared traditions and 
practices of global social policy formation and allocative decision-making. 
 Disputes like Softwood and the NAFTA panel process generally can thus be seen 
as forming part of the meta-state level of shared understandings concerning conflicting 
global claims.  Both the dispute and the institutional processes which managed it are part 
of an emerging community involving Canada and the US.  If so, then the dispute is in 
some important sense an internal one, which by its very nature reinforces and is 
constitutive of community.     
 
IV. Implications of Globalization for International Law and for the Fair Trade/Free 
Trade Debate 
 I am not suggesting that at this point in our history global social relations in toto 
form the sort of full-blown political community which communitarians point to in 
domestic social relations as their exemplar.  In my view, however, globalization is 
creating a third alternative: global society understood as containing “limited” degrees of 
community in specific functional areas.39 If we disaggregate the notion of community, 
                                                 
39 Moreover, the trend is towards increasing community.  Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus list Rwanda 
and Somalia as examples of a weak solidarity which can suggest that the concept of global community is 
either half-full, or half-empty.  They decide it is half-full, asking “After all, who would have cared - and 
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we can see that globalization is creating certain elements of community at the global 
level, such as knowledge of inter-connectedness and the circumstances of the other; and 
creating true community in certain areas of global social relations, such as humanitarian 
relief and transboundary economic relations, by establishing that degree of social bond 
necessary to support justice.  This means that global society taken as a whole may not 
rise in all cases to the level of community which communitarians posit, but has enough 
elements of community, and contains enough pockets of community, to support an 
inquiry into justice in at least in some areas of global social relations. 
 A. International Law or Global Public Law? 
 If we look at international law as, not the law of nations, but as the law of an 
emerging global community, then we see two fundamental gaps: the absence of effective 
mechanisms for global wealth transfers at the scale necessary to support the global basic 
package; and the absence of effective political representation or voice at the global 
level.40 How we get there, and in the process complete the transformation from 
international law to global public law, will require a profound re-examination of core 
international legal doctrines and institutions such as boundaries, sovereignty, legitimacy, 
citizenship, and the territorial control of resources.   
 Let me suggest as an example and a starting point, that we must re-think the role 
of territorial political boundaries.  Territorial boundaries now serve as the frame on which 
we hang various concepts of distributive justice such as citizenship and the territorial 
control of resources, which profoundly influence the life prospects of all affected 
                                                                                                                                                 
how - a hundred years ago.”  “The ‘International Community:’ Facing the Challenge of Globalization,” 9 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 266, 276 (1998). 
40 Jay Mandle and Louis Ferleger refer to this as the need for institutional mechanisms for compensation 
and control, two fundamental elements of the regulation of global market society.  “Preface: Dimensions of 
Globalization,” 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 16 (2000).  
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individuals.  By privileging citizens over non-citizens in terms of access to basic rights, 
the political boundary of citizenship dramatically affects our life prospects on the basis of 
one of the most arbitrary aspects of our natural condition – the place we are born.  In the 
words of one commentator, “Citizenship in western liberal democracies is the modern 
equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life 
chances.”41   
 Citizenship thus illustrates how the current “society of states” model of 
international law permits territorial boundaries to function at the global level as one of the 
main obstacles to the delivery of basic rights.  If global community is possible, and 
emerging, as I have argued, then we have to re-think the discretion given states to use 
boundaries as primary determinants of global justice.42 We need to develop a model for 
the international delivery of the basic package – a concept of effective global citizenship 
if you will – in which the accident of birthplace, or the vagaries of naturalization law, do 
not fundamentally affect each person’s life prospects. 
 In order to do so, global public law needs to tackle distributive issues both 
between and within states.  The “society of states” model put the question of justice 
outside the realm of international law.  Globalization means that the problem of 
                                                 
41 Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” in KYMLICKA, THE RIGHTS OF 
MINORITY CULTURES (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1995). 
42 As things stand, there is a pernicious anomaly: free movement of capital but no free movement of 
persons, which could be seen as a deliberate attempt to keep labor costs from equalizing.  A global 
economic space demands something approaching the free movement of persons, subject to some notion of 
carrying capacity or assimilation rate.  The very idea conjures images of unsupportable mass migrations, 
which are not inevitable, nor are they the necessary result of changes in border policies.  The primary 
reason for such shifts would be economic inequality, a subject which poses a central challenge to global 
public law. 
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inequality is a central problem of global social relations, in the same way it is a central 
problem of justice at the domestic level.43   
 What should the role of the state be in a global public order?  Global community 
demands a new view of this role, in which the state no longer holds a monopoly on the 
delivery of basic public goods, but must nevertheless play a central role in such delivery, 
including that of the guarantor of last resort.44 However, this does not mean that global 
institutions must be modeled on domestic institutions: a sort of world state.  Rather, we 
must see that, in normative terms, global institutions must be justifiable according to the 
same principles we apply in domestic political theory, whatever their shape.  Their 
legitimacy can no longer rest entirely on their creation by states along duly authorized 
treaty lines, but will require some increased form of public participation, reflecting 
normative principles of political theory in the same way that domestic institutions must.45  
 B. The Role of International Economic Law 
 As a field, international economic law needs to move beyond question of if or 
whether international economic law is a form of global governance and ask instead how 
and to what end we are governing? It is no accident that international economic law is the 
site for addressing questions of institutional design, legitimacy and distributive justice.  
This is so because regulatory globalization is central to globalization as a whole, and 
because it is in economic relations that we find the strongest international organizations 
today. 
                                                 
43 See generally FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST 
TRADE (Transnational 2003) (arguing a central role for inequality in contemporary international economic 
relations). 
44 Indeed, Manuel Castells has argued that globalization is bringing about a new form of nation-state, the 
“network state,” whose principle duty is to successfully manage on our behalf this web of networks.  THE 
POWER OF IDENTITY 242-273 (BLACKWELL 1997).   
45 See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS 1989). 
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  1 Global Justice and International Economic Institutions 
 If international economic law is a core part of the global basic structure for 
delivering economic justice, then we need to analyze, negotiate and structure it with 
reference to appropriate normative principles.  Is international economic law facilitating 
the kinds of wealth transfers which global justice might require?  Is it allocating social 
goods in a normatively defensible manner?  Meeting this challenge has several 
implications. 
 First, we need to identify normative principles that are appropriate for application 
at the global level in a context of pluralism.  There is increasing interest within political 
theory on the question of global justice, at both the private party/transaction level of 
justice, and at the level of public or structural principles of justice.46
 To complement this, there needs to be more work within the legal academy 
applying principles of justice to economic law institutions.  There is an increasing interest 
in the normative aspects of the WTO.47  The basic work on trade and justice should be 
extended to other international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, in order to develop a comprehensive theory of justice in international economic 
relations.48   
  2 The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Global Economic Institutions 
 This converges with the need for increased attention to the legitimacy and 
effectiveness aspects of international economic law institutions.  As lawyers, we have a 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, “Why Trade Law Needs a Theory of Justice,” 100 ASIL Proc. 214, 379 notes 
6-9 and sources cited therein (2006). 
47 Id. at 379 notes 10-12 and sources cited therein.. 
48 See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, “Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions,” – J. Int’l. Econ. L. – 
(2007) (forthcoming); Robert Hockett, From “Mission Creep” to Gestalt Switch: Justice, Finance, the 
IFIs, and Globalization’s Intended Beneficiaries, 37 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 167, 179-181 (2005). 
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special responsibility when it comes to such multilateral institutions, which we create to 
deliver basic public goods independent of nationality, even if still often administered 
through national units.  The central questions in Softwood about how these various levels 
of institutional process should best interact with, defer to, or supersede each other, 
illustrate the kinds of questions we as lawyers are best equipped to address, particularly 
insofar as we understand them in the largest possible context.   
 I have argued in this essay that this context is globalization, and within this 
context such questions should be seen as the working out of meta-state governance 
systems for an emerging global community.  If this is so, then our political tradition 
requires that the legitimacy of such institutions no longer rest entirely on their creation by 
states along duly authorized treaty lines, but depend upon some increased form of public 
participation, reflecting normative principles of political theory in the same way that 
domestic institutions must.49 This is part of the constitutionalism debate currently carried 
out in international economic law.50
 
V Conclusion 
 To summarize, I have argued that in global relations today we see, both inter-
subjectively and at the regulatory level, the constitutive elements of a limited global 
community emerging.  Globalization itself is a process of creating a new global identity, 
consisting of shared understandings, practices and traditions capable of supporting 
                                                 
49 See BRILMAYER, supra note 45.   
50  On the constitutional and law-making function of trade institutions, and their shortcomings in this 
regard, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. 
& BUS. 398 (1997); but see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the 
Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647 (2005) (arguing that Petersmann’s account is 
descriptively inaccurate and normatively undesirable). 
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obligations of justice.  Members of this new global space are increasingly aware of each 
other’s needs and circumstances, increasingly capable of effectively addressing these 
needs, and increasingly contributing to these circumstances in the first place.  They find 
themselves involved in the same global market society, and together these members look 
to the same organizations, especially those at the meta-state level, to provide regulatory 
approaches to addressing problems of global social policy.  These organizations, in 
addressing such needs, are involved in allocating the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation, such as rights, opportunities, privileges, membership and resources, 
activities that have been traditionally understood in the domestic sphere to make justice 
both relevant and necessary. 
 All of this is not to argue that global community has emerged fully formed, with 
the richness and force of the national community.  However, taken together, these 
developments allow us to begin to speak in important ways of limited degrees of 
community, or “spheres of justice” to borrow Walzer’s phrase, with respect to different 
issues, institutions or sets of social relations within the global social space.  Thus we can 
speak of “limited global community” in the economic sphere, as embracing that level of 
“community” necessary to support relations of justice, even if it does not manifest that 
level of community necessary to speak of “global community” in the fullest 
communitarian sense. 
 Returning to Softwood, a globalization perspective allows us to see that the many 
private and institutional participants in the dispute, through pursuing their private agendas 
and public mandates, have been doing far more than resolving a particular trade dispute.  
They have been participating in, creating and defining a new trans-border community, 
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and elaborating the meta-state institutions which both mediate, and help constitute, such a 
community.  In this sense, the dispute is not about ensuring that trade law is “fair” for the 
U.S. or for Canada, but that it is fair as the public law of an emerging transboundary 
community. 
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